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The judicial review of the European Union industrial cartels 
Anca D. Chirita* 
 
 
 
A. Introduction 
The public enforcement of the European Union (EU) prohibition of hard-core 
cartels, in particular, price-fixing agreements, reflects the mission of the European 
Commission (EC) to detect and punish any professional or trade association of 
producers or manufacturers that pursue exclusively speculative commercial profits 
at the expense of consumer welfare. Secret cartels among competing producers or 
manufacturers stifle free competition on the basis of price or quantity.1 Most 
cartels affect the welfare of intermediate consumers in a particular industry, 
thereby imposing significant restraints upon competition. A classical division 
operates between horizontal and vertical agreements. Horizontal agreements 
among producers or manufacturers that unlawfully intend to fix prices, divide 
markets, or restrict competition, reflect a major conspiracy in trade against the 
public interest. In contrast, vertical agreements among manufacturers and their 
distributors or retailers are often perceived as less harmful.2 
Industrial organization has identified several types of harmful cartels on the basis 
of similar indicators, such as price, quotas, allocation of territories or customers, 
                                                        
*  Dr. iur. Anca D. Chirita is Lecturer in competition law, Durham Law School, England, 
United Kingdom (E-mail: a.d.chirita@durham.ac.uk). Earlier drafts of this paper benefited 
from insightful suggestions and comments from the participants and chairs of the 10th 
Annual Conference of the Italian Society of Law and Economics, at the University of 
Rome “La Sapienza” in December 2014 and of The Society of Legal Scholars Annual 
Conference at the University of Nottingham in September 2014. 
1  See e.g. Heimler, Cartels in Public Procurement, J of Comp Law & Ec 8 (2012), p. 849; 
Smuda, Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of EU Competition Law, J of Comp L 
& Ec 10 (2013), p. 65. On the economics of price-fixing, see seminal papers by Kaplow, 
Direct versus Communications-Based Prohibitions on Price Fixing, Harvard John M. Olin 
Discussion Paper Series no 703/2011; Connor/Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: 
Crime Pays, Cardozo L Rev 34 (2012), p. 427. 
2  See Gundlach/Cannon, Resale Price Maintenance: A Review and Call for Research, American 
Antitrust Institute Working Paper No 14-03 (2014); Asker/Bar-Isaac, Raising Retailers 
Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals, American Ec Rev 104 (2014), 
p. 672; Sahuguet/Walckiers, Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracies: the Vertical Expression of a 
Horizontal Desire?, J Eur Comp L & Practice 5 (2014), p. 11 et seqq. 
  
standardisation/specialisation, costs, and rebate cartels.3 While it is widely accepted 
that the above cartels harm consumer welfare, the enforcement of Article 101 
TFEU demonstrates a constant focus on major industrial cartels.4 Suffice it to 
mention here that the EU Commission has imposed €1.68 billion in cartel fines in 
2014, following two previous peak years of over €1.8 billion each. Since 1990 this 
new Robin Hood has taken an impressive €22,654 billion away from the richest 
industrial giants back to the benefit of his own citizens. It is a fact, not a praise, 
that the EU Commission’s extremely effective and efficient public enforcement 
against harmful cartels has recently covered all the major sectors of the EU’s supra-
national economy from flat glass, car glass, air freight, cement, electric cables, 
industrial bags, road pavement bitumen, ‘bearings’ for cars and trucks, calcium 
carbide and magnesium, installation and maintenance of elevators and escalators, 
high voltage power cables, candle waxes, paraffin and slack waxes, gas insulated 
switchgear, heat stabilisers, plastic industrial bags, zip fasteners, aluminium 
fluoride, carbonless paper, liquid crystal display panels for TVs, notebooks, and 
PC monitors, bleaching agents, butadiene rubber, bathroom fittings and fixtures, 
removals, to carbonless paper.5 
                                                        
3  See e.g. Lipczynski/Wilson/Goddard, Industrial Organization: Competition, Policy and 
Strategy, 4th ed. 2013; Waldman/Jensen, Industrial Organization: Theory and Practice, 4th 
ed. 2013, p. 288 et seqq. 
4  See Chirita, A Focus on: Recent Developments in EU Cartels, Oxford Competition Law, 
2014. 
5  ECJ, case C-580/12 P, Guardian Industries and Guardian Europe v EC (COMP/39165, Flat 
glass); GC, case T-68/09, Soliver NV v EC (COMP/39125, Carglass); GC, case T-534/11, 
Schenker AG v EC; GC, case T-292/11, Cemex and others: GC, case T-293/11, Holcim 
(Deutschland) and Holcim; GC, case T-296/11, Cementos Portland Valderrivas; GC, case T-
297/11, Buzzi Unicem; GC, case T-302/11, Heidelberg Cement; GC, case T-305/11, 
Italmobiliare; GC, case T-306/11, Schwenk Zement v Commission; ECJ, case C-37/13 P, Nexans 
SA, Nexans France SAS v EC; GC, case T-135/09, Nexans France and Nexans v EC; ECJ, 
case C-243/12 P, FLS Plast A/S v EC (COMP 4634/2005; COMP/F/38354, Industrial 
Bags); ECJ, case C-36/12, Armando Alvarez SA v EC (COMP/F/38354, Industrial bags); ECJ, 
case C-35/12 P, Plásticos Españoles SA (ASPLA) v EC (COMP/F/38354, Industrial Bags); 
ECJ, case C-612/12 P, Ballast Nedam NV v EC (COMP/F/38456, Bitumen (Netherlands)); 
Almunia, Introductory Remarks on Bearings cartel, speech/14/233 of 19/3/2014; EC, 
press release IP/14/2002 of 20/11/2014; ECJ, case C-90/13 P, 1.garantovana s.a. v EC; GC, 
case T-406/09, Donau Chemie v EC (COMP/39396, Calcium carbide and magnesium based 
products); ECJ, case C-501/11 P, Schindler Holding Ltd and others v EC; ECJ, case C-557/12, 
Kone AG and Others v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG (COMP/E-1/38823, Elevators and Escalators); 
EC, press release IP/14/358 of 2/4/2014; GC, case T-540/08, Esso Societé anonyme française, 
Esso Deutschland and others v EC (COMP/39181, Candle Waxes); GC, case T-541/08, Sasol 
and others v EC; GC, case T-543/08, RWE AG, RWE Dea AG v EC (COMP/39181, Candle 
Waxes); ECJ, joined cases C-231/11 P to C-233/11 P, EC v Simemens AG Österreich, VA 
Tech Transmission & Distribution and others, Nuova Magrini Galileo SpA; ECJ, joined cases C-
239/11 P, C-489/11 P, and C-498/11 P, Siemens AG, Mitsubishi Electric Corp and Toshiba 
Corp. v EC (COMP/F/38899, Gas Insulated Switchgear); GC, case T-30/10, Regens SpA v EC 
(COMP/38589, Heat Stabilisers); GC, case T-181/10, Reagens SpA v EC; ECJ, case C-
  
In the banking sector, producers of smart card chips,6 which are used in mobile 
telephone SIM cards, and bank and identity cards, were hit with a major €138 
million fine. Furthermore, action regarding the interest rate derivatives cartels 
involving forward rate agreements and credit default swaps,7 especially the record 
€1.7 billion fine,8 has consolidated the EC’s excellent reputation when it comes to 
detecting and punishing banking cartels. Another €14.9 million fine was imposed 
on the UK based broker ICAP for having disseminated misleading information to 
certain JPY LIBOR panel banks with regard to future expectations of the 
prevailing LIBOR rates, as well as for attempting to influence LIBOR 
submissions. JP Morgan and Barclays were involved in the Swiss franc interest rate 
                                                                                                                                 
238/12 P, FLSmidth & Co A/S v EC; GC, case T-65/06, FLSmidth v EC 
(COMP/F/38354, Industrial bags); opinion of AG Wathelet, ECJ, case C-408/12 P, YKK 
Corp., YKK Holding Europe BV, YKK Stocko Fasteners GmbH v EC; ECJ, case C-467/13 P, 
Industrie Chimiques du Fluor SA (ICF) v EC (COMP/39180, Aluminium Fluoride); ECJ, case C-
414/12 P, Bolloré v EC; GC, case T-91/11, InnoLux Corp v EC (COMP/39309, LCS – 
Liquid Crystal Displays); ECJ, case C-446/11 P, Commission v Edison SpA; ECJ, case C-
447/11 P, Caffaro Srl v Commission; ECJ, case C-448/11 P, SNIA SpA v Commission; ECJ, 
case C-449/11 P, Solvay Solexis SpA v Commission; ECJ, case C-455/11 P, Solvay SA v 
Commission − bleaching agents (COMP/F/38620, Hydrogen Peroxide and Perborate); ECJ, case C-
499/11 P, The Dow Chemical Company, Dow Deutschland Anlagengesellschaft mbH, Dow Europe 
GmbH v EC (COMP/F/38638, Butadiene Rubber and Emulsion Styrene Butadiene Rubber); ECJ, 
case C-511/11 P, Versalis SpA v EC; GC, case T-378/10, Masco Corp, Hansgrohe, Hüpe and 
others v EC (COMP/39092, Bathroom Fittings and Fixtures); GC joined cases T-379/10 and T-
381/10, Keramag Keramische Werke AG, Koralle Sanitärprodukte GmbH, Koninklijke Sphinx BV, 
Allia SAS, Produit Céramique de Touraine SA, Pozzi Ginori SpA, Sanitec Europe Oy v EC 
(Bathroom Fittings and Fixtures); opinion of AG Kokott, ECJ, case C-439/11 P, Ziegler SA v 
EC; GC, case T-372/10, Bolloré v EC (COMP/36212, Carbonless paper). 
6  EC, Antitrust: Commission fines smart card chips producers €138 million for cartel, press 
release IP/14/960 of 3/9/2014. 
7  See, EC, Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to ICAP for suspected 
participation in yen interest rate derivatives cartels, press release IP/14/656 of 10/6/2014; 
on RBS, UBS, JP Morgan and Credit Suisse agreeing the ‘bid-ask’ spread, i.e. the difference 
between the price at which a bank is willing to sell and buy a given product, see e.g. 
European Commission, Statement by Vice President Joaquin Almunia on 2 cartel decisions 
concerning Swiss Franc Related Derivatives’, Brussels of 21/10/2014. 
8  COMP/39861, Yen Interest Rate Derivatives (YIRD), decision of 4/2/2015 and 
COMP/39914, Euro Interest Rate Derivatives, decision of 4/12/2013; both decisions are not 
yet available as of 19/6/2015, thus reported in the Report on Competition Policy 2013, 
COM (2014) 249 final of 6/5/2014, p. 4. See also, European Commission, Antitrust: 
Commission sends Statement of Objections to Crédit Agricole, HSBC and JP Morgan for 
suspected participation in euro interest rate derivatives cartel, press release IP/14/572 of 
20/5/2014; European Commssion, Antitrust: Commission fines banks €1.71 billion for 
participating in cartels in the interest rate derivatives industry, press release IP/13/1208 of 
4/12/2013. Comparatively on the US cartel, see Connor, Big Bad Banks: Bid Rigging and 
Multilateral Market Manipulation, American Antitrust Institute Working Paper no 14-04 
(2014). 
  
derivatives cartel,9 having previously discussed forthcoming CHF LIBOR 
submissions and exchanged sensitive information concerning trading predictions 
and future prices by using online chats on the Bloomberg and/or Reuter’s 
platforms. The Commission found that during May to September 2007 traders at 
Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS, JP Morgan, and Credit Suisse agreed to quote fixed 
bid-ask-spreads on Swiss over-the counter derivatives.10 Such spreads represent 
the difference between the bidding and the asking price respectively at which a 
trader is willing to buy or sell a particular contract. 
In sharp contrast, significantly fewer recent cartels, namely, bananas,11 North Sea 
shrimps,12 raw tobacco,13 and canned mushrooms14 stand out as isolated examples 
of EU cartels that harm the final consumer directly. Statistically, however, an 
overwhelming number of the cartels detected by the EC harm industrial, i.e., 
intermediate consumers, and only a negligible fraction harm the welfare of EU 
citizens. Recent examples of industrial cartels include bid-rigging and the exchange 
of commercially-sensitive information in Nexans15 or the setting of price factors 
and trends in Bananas.16 The latest cartels have frequently embraced the unwritten 
form of oral gentlemen’s agreements,17 for example, in Toshiba, between European 
and Japanese producers of power transformers.18 
 
B. A substantive review of the EU public enforcement against cartels 
I. The purpose or intent of agreements: quo vadis effects? 
Within the meaning of Article 101, to demonstrate the existence of an anti-
competitive agreement, it is sufficient that cartelists express their intention to 
behave in the market in a certain way. In other words, there is a clear 
                                                        
9  COMP, case AT-39924, Swiss Franc Interest Rate Derivatives (CHF LIBOR), decision of 
21/10/2014.  
10  Ibid., para. 26. 
11  GC, case T-588/08, Dole Food Company, Inc., Dole Germany OHG v EC, 
ECLI:EU:T:2013:130; COMP/39188, Bananas. 
12  COMP/39633, Shrimps. 
13  See ECJ, case C-578/11 P, Deltafina SpA v EC, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1742. 
14  European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines three producers of canned 
mushrooms €32 million in cartel settlement, press release IP/14/727 of 25/6/2014. 
15  ECJ, case C-37/13 P, Nexans SA and Nexans France SAS v EC, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2030. 
16  GC, case T-588/08, Dole Food Company, Inc., Dole Germany OHG v EC, 
ECLI:EU:T:2013:130, para. 256. 
17  GC, case T-519/09, Toshiba Corp. v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2014:263. 
18  Ibid., para. 8. 
  
materialisation of their ‘concurrence of wills’ so as to restrict competition.19 In 
practice, because most cartels take place clandestinely, i.e. in secret meetings, the 
associated written documentation is reduced to a minimum.20 For example, the 
“Crystal meetings” held in Taiwanese hotels, had the anti-competitive object of 
fixing minimum prices for LCD panels.21 In Car glass,22 triangular club meetings 
were held in hotels in various towns, in the private homes of the employees of 
those undertakings, and at the premises of their European trade association, the 
aim being to monitor market shares, the allocation of supplies of car glass to 
manufacturers, the exchange of information on prices, and other sensitive 
information. Therefore, even undated or unsigned documents have a recognised 
probative value, especially where their origin, probable date, and content can be 
determined with sufficient certainty.23 For example, in Paraffin and Slack Waxes,24 
the EC inferred from a manuscript note that an arrow preceding the price figure 
was probably part of an agreed future strategy of a price increase. In Car glass,25 a 
handwritten record of a telephone conversation between the cartelist’s sales 
manager and the representative of its wholly-owned subsidiary was used as 
evidence of the cartelist’s awareness of the cartel. Thus, in Fittings,26 the EC lost its 
appeal before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which disputed the General 
Court’s (GC) inaccurate reasoning in arguing that one particular, isolated 
handwritten note was insufficient to prove participation in this cartel. 
However, the mere participation in meetings remains insufficient to prove the 
existence of an unlawful cartel in the absence of any further evidence of the anti-
competitive nature of such meetings.27 In Car glass,28 the cartelist pretended not to 
have properly understood the overall scope of the cartel due to its limited 
cooperation. Despite the existent identity of purpose between the cartel agreement 
in question and the overall cartel, the Court judged that the cartelist was thus not 
responsible for the overall cartel. The decisive criterion should be whether the 
participating undertaking “knew or should have known that in doing so it was 
                                                        
19  Ibid., para. 34. 
20  Ibid., para. 93. 
21  GC, case T-91/11, InnoLux Corp v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2014:92, para. 15. 
22  GC, case T-68/09, Soliver NV v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2014:867. 
23  GC, case T-91/11, InnoLux Corp v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2014:92, para. 94. 
24  GC, case T-541/08, Sasol et. al v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2014:628, para 300. 
25  GC, case T-68/09, Soliver NV v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2014:867. 
26  ECJ, case C-287/11 P, EC v Aalberts Industries NV and others, ECLI:EU:C:2013:445; GC, 
case T-385/06, Aalberts Industries and Others v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2011:114; COMP/F1/38121, 
Fittings. 
27  GC, case T-91/11, InnoLux Corp v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2014:92, para. 184. 
28  GC, case T-68/09, Soliver NV v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2014:867. 
  
joining the cartel as a whole, thereby expressing its accession to that cartel”. In 
endorsing this interpretation, the Court rejected the EC’s previous, rather 
comfortable, categorisation of “single and continuous infringement”29 as a means 
of imputing liability for the overall cartel, except where the undertaking itself had 
participated in meetings and engaged in certain forms of anti-competitive conduct. 
Where an undertaking had simply attended such meetings, even if it had not 
participated actively, and later that undertaking had not distanced itself publicly 
from what was being said or agreed in the meeting, this factor counts as 
acquiescence of the respective cartel.30 Furthermore, an undertaking that had 
participated in such meetings “without manifestly opposing to them” meets the 
EC’s requisite standard to establish participation in the cartel.31 For example, in 
Candle Waxes,32 the cartelists argued that they had neither participated in technical 
meetings, nor ever been informed of the outcome, since their own representative 
had concealed the anti-competitive content of such meetings. Before the GC, this 
argument did not count as the undertaking “publicly distancing” itself from the 
cartel. There was evidence of emails seeking to arrange the next technical meeting 
with the representative. The GC recalled that even if the undertaking had not 
participated in certain meetings, a presumption operated that the undertaking took 
account of information already exchanged with its competitors.33 
Once more, these recent developments demonstrate the harshness of the 
approach adopted by the EC when it comes to pernicious cartels, and it renders 
obsolete the running of professional or trade-association meetings in pursuit of 
common pricing, or even non-pricing, strategies. For example, the simple 
attendance of certain meetings was sufficient to prove the existence of the 
Industrial Bags cartel.34 It is then for the undertaking concerned to prove that its 
participation in those meetings “was without any anti-competitive intention”.35 
This requires the undertaking to prove that it had indicated to its competitors that 
                                                        
29  Although the EC had failed to establish that the infringement was continuous, this did not 
impede its categorisation as “repeated”, see GC, joined cases T-147 and 148/09, Trelleborg 
Industrie SAS and Trelleborg AB v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2013:259. 
30  GC, case T-91/11, InnoLux Corp v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2014:92, para. 206. 
31  GC, joined cases T-379/10 and T-381/10, Keramag Keramische Werke and others v EC, 
ECLI:EU:T:2013:457, para. 136. 
32  GC, case T-540/08, Esso Societé anonyme française, Esso Deutschland and others v EC, 
ECLI:EU:T:2014:630. 
33  Ibid. 
34  ECJ, case C-35/12 P, Plásticos Españoles SA (ASPLA) v EC, ECLI:EU:C:2014:348, para. 16. 
35  See also GC, case T-46/10, Faci SpA v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2014:138, para. 55; COMP/38589, 
Heat Stabilisers. 
  
it was “participating in those meetings in a spirit that was different from theirs”.36 
For example, in Heat Stabilisers, in an internal memorandum, an employee had 
already highlighted to his supervisors the need to mention that their undertaking 
no longer wished to participate in meetings where “red papers” detailed group 
decisions to raise prices.37 However, in Zip fasteners,38 the GC warned that the 
concept of “publicly distancing oneself” from the cartel must be construed 
narrowly in order to establish liability for the cartel activity in question. Therefore, 
silence in a meeting could not be interpreted as an expression of “firm and 
unambiguous” disapproval. 
The EC is under no obligation to consider mitigating circumstances, e.g. the non-
implementation of the cartel, unless the undertaking concerned shows that it 
“clearly and substantially” opposed its implementation to the “point of disrupting 
the very functioning” of the cartel.39 Again, such an interpretation constructs yet 
another major obstacle for any undertaking being caught in the very existence of 
the cartel up to the moment of instant realisation that, in recent practice, the only 
safe way out of it is to blow the whistle on the cartel.  
One controversial issue is that where a cartel has the object of restricting 
competition, it is not deemed further necessary to prove its actual effects.40 This 
can be traced back to the KME ruling,41 where, relying on the old case-law of 
Consten and Grunding,42 the ECJ advanced the following apodictic pronouncement, 
namely, that (i) “there is no need to take account of the concrete effects of an 
agreement once it appears that it has as its object the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition”, and (ii) price-fixing and market sharing are “obvious” 
restrictions of competition. Overall, the above pronouncement does not pursue an 
“effects-based approach” that could otherwise see the Courts shoulder a greater 
burden of proof when it comes to actual effects. Furthermore, the same 
explanation emerged in Car glass,43 where it was explicitly stated that there is no 
need to take account of the agreement’s actual effects once it appears that its 
object is to prevent, restrict or distort competition. Following this reasoning, 
attending a cartel meeting but not increasing the prices, as discussed and agreed in 
                                                        
36  Ibid., para. 127, citing ECJ, case C-204/00 P, Aalborg Portland v EC, ECLI:EU:C:2004:6, 
para. 81; GC, case T-541/08, Sasol and others v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2014:628, para. 306. 
37  Ibid., para. 160. 
38  GC, case T-448/07, YKK and others v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2012:322, para 116; COMP/39168, 
PO/Hard Haberdashery: Fasteners. 
39  Ibid., para. 267. 
40  Ibid., para. 227. 
41  ECJ, case C-389/10 P, KME and others v EC, ECLI:EU:C:2011:816, para. 75. 
42  ECJ, joined cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grunding v EC, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41. 
43  GC, case T-68/09, Soliver NV v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2014:867. 
  
that meeting, will still be captured as a ‘restriction of competition by object’, even 
if the author’s intention fails to materialise. 
In Toshiba, the Courts examined the object of preventing, restricting, or distorting 
competition by looking at the ‘content and economic context’ of an anti-
competitive agreement.44 For example, even a gentlemen’s agreement aimed at 
protecting EU domestic producers against actual or potential competition from 
Japanese producers was found to be capable of restricting competition within the 
EU internal market, since insurmountable barriers to entry into the internal market 
need to be overcome.45 In the wake of a subsequent reference to inter-Member 
States’ trade and the “potential risk” of impeding the realisation of the single 
market, the ECJ projected the political goal of market integration to its outer 
boundaries in an international context.46 The tone of this pronouncement 
becomes even more explicit where the Court refers to “any”, i.e. cross-EU border, 
cartel that is “capable of constituting a threat” to the freedom of trade among 
Member States, but in such a manner that it could simply “harm the attainment of 
the objectives of a single market”.47 The said market-partitioning agreement was, 
nevertheless, capable of adversely affecting the structure of the internal market.48 
In conclusion, there is no traceable shift of the wider competition policy 
perspective when it comes to the overarching goal of the specific provision of 
Article 101, namely, to protect not the “immediate interests of individual 
competitors or consumers”, but the structure of the market and thus competition 
as such.49 Judging by the significant number of giant industrial cartels’ 
pronouncements in the name of intermediate consumers, it seems that the political 
goal of market integration has reached an evolutionary stage by protecting certain 
market participants in the free game of competition that stand somewhere in the 
middle of this process of market consolidation. Certainly, sparse resources make it 
more difficult for the EC to detect more of the little, but ugly cartels that harm the 
welfare of final consumers because their perceived effect is less toxic and pervasive 
in the structure of the internal market itself; nonetheless, their effect is felt much 
more intensely in the EU citizens’ pockets. Judging by the geographical reach of 
the EU cartels, it would be difficult to convince, say, EU citizens living in the 
                                                        
44  Ibid., para. 230, recalling ECJ, case C-209/07, Beef Industry Development Society and Barry 
Brothers, ECLI:EU:C:2008:643, para. 227. Generally on Toshiba, see Monti, Managing 
Decentralized Antitrust Enforcement: Toshiba, CML Rev 51 (2014), p. 261 et seqq. 
45  Ibid. 
46  GC, case T-68/09, Soliver NV v EC, ECLI:EU:T:2014:867, para. 239. 
47  Ibid., para. 240. 
48  Ibid., para. 241. 
49  GC, case T-588/08, Dole Food Company, Inc., Dole Germany OHG v EC, 
ECLI:EU:T:2013:130, para. 545. 
  
North East of England of the importance of the elevators and escalators cartel, 
but the North Sea shrimps cartel was certainly a notable success. Thus, one would 
not argue much in favour of the popularity of a specific cartel in the eyes of the 
EU public recognising that, by having removed the national boundaries for the 
purpose of an integrated EU market, the EC has stretched itself quite far. So the 
price to pay for the consolidation of its internal market is that when it comes to 
EU cartel enforcement policy and prioritisation, the fantastic work done by the EC 
is never enough. Many of what I would call “little” cartels, at least at the EU supra-
national level, look inoffensive, as a narrow oligopoly is actually monopolistic in its 
pursuits at the Member State national level. Allowing it to escape twice, including 
due to the scarcity of resources at a national level, could jeopardise this achieved 
consolidation. In other words, we are grateful to the EC for fining not only giant 
but, particularly, such little EU cartels. 
It is rather curious that the EU Courts have kept intact their well-established 
position that the parties’ intention to engage in a concerted practice, for example, 
by means of anti-competitive pre-pricing communications, should not be taken as 
an “essential pre-condition” to the finding of an anti-competitive agreement.50 
Understandably, the anti-competitive “object” or purpose is based on the objective 
intent of the parties to reach an agreement, whereas its anti-competitive ‘effect’ is 
to be ascertained in the situation where an oral arrangement is seen rather as a lack 
of final agreement. Following this logic, an individual victim of a cartel could rely 
on either the contractual or the tortious measure to claim damages. On the basis of 
the former measure, in order to prove an anti-competitive object, the victim needs 
to rely primarily on establishing the objective intent. On the basis of the tortious 
measure, the victim needs to infer abstention from an established anti-competitive 
effect. In other words, quasi-delictual inaction needs to be ascertained in situations 
where intention cannot be established easily, or with certainty, from the parties’ 
actions, but can possibly still be inferred from the whole of the evidence being 
submitted. Even in this latter uncomfortable situation, one should acknowledge 
that, despite not being 100 % sure of the objective intention of the parties, their 
inaction, for example, being unconsciously trapped in dubious cartel meetings, 
could trigger a quasi-contractual, i.e. tortious, liability, as the anti-competitive 
effect could still be inferred from such inaction. 
In Doyle (Bananas),51 the GC simply recalled that any coordination between 
undertakings that “knowingly” includes practical cooperation in the form of 
exchanges of information to eliminate the risk of competition is tantamount to 
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collusion.52 This explicit, i.e. intentional, conduct is therefore by its “very nature” 
injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition.53 In contrast, even 
non-explicit manifestations of tacit collusion, where such intentional conduct is 
invisible for the purpose of proper detection, could still restrict competition 
through an inflicted harmful anti-competitive effect, which is, nevertheless, being 
created while undertakings tacitly abide by the rules of an established cartel whose 
existence is known to non-cartel members. 
The Court went on to explicitly endorse a “systematic and consistent” 
interpretation of the EC’s soft law Guidelines according to which price-fixing, 
market-sharing, and output-limitation agreements are “by their very nature among 
the most harmful restrictions of competition”.54 For example, in Versalis,55 the 
ECJ articulated once more that  
“horizontal price or market sharing agreements may be classified as very serious 
infringements solely on account of their nature, without the EC being required to 
demonstrate an actual impact of the infringement on the market”.56 
While this could be acceptable on the EC’s part, it may be expected that the 
Courts will engage in a fuller analysis of such an impact. Thus, the illicit and 
immoral purpose of these agreements, as suggested by the explicit reference to 
their “very nature”, does not push them straight into the corner of “the object 
box”,57 but their practical materialisation makes the actual difference in terms of 
negative outcomes. At the end of the day, a cartel initiator hits the object box, 
while its followers, even if not “friends” with the initiator, could tacitly touch on 
“the effect box” by consolidating the same very harmful cartel. 
Pre-pricing communications were found to reduce the uncertainty regarding the 
pricing of bananas,58 against the exercise of “free and undistorted competition”, 
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namely, the requirement that each producer determine autonomously its own 
pricing policy.59 In practice, an autonomous setting of the price bans further 
contact among producers, of bananas or other goods, aimed at influencing the 
market strategy of other actual or potential competitors.60 In Bathroom Fittings and 
Fixtures,61 the price coordination among eight associations of manufacturers and 
three umbrella associations included the exchange of recent sales data and 
forecasts. In Keremag,62 while the disclosure of sensitive information removed 
uncertainty regarding the future conduct of a competitor, it certainly did not 
“deprive operators of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing or 
anticipated conduct of their competitors”.63 However, “any direct or indirect 
contact between them, the object or effect of which is to create conditions of 
competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market in 
question”64 is strictly precluded. What the EC wanted to say here is that exchanges 
of information of this kind are best avoided.  
In contrast, in Pierre Fabre,65 in the context of a selective distribution system, 
vertical price-fixing agreements that required distributors to sell cosmetics only in 
the presence of a pharmacist were found to operate as a ban on online sales, which 
had restricting competition as its ‘object’ rather than its effect. Through the setting 
of an additional obstacle to cosmetics sales, while such mandatory marketing 
requirements may protect vulnerable consumers, the effect of the ban could still 
restrict competition. This is yet another example of unorthodoxy where the Court 
embraced instead the concept of a restriction by object, as it did in Allianz 
Hungaria66and in Groupement des cartes bancaires.67 In the latter case, the ECJ 
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identified an error made by the GC when it took for granted that the object of the 
anti-competitive agreements in question was ‘obvious’ from the actual formulas 
envisaged by a mechanism encouraging members to expand their activities by 
acquiring more bank cards in return for a membership fee. A supplementary fee 
applied to members tripling their acquiring transactions and a dormant fee applied 
to inactive members.68 The effect of the above fees was to limit these members’ 
activities and the competition among them. The GC had disregarded the degree of 
harm these fees caused. From the objective intention of certain group members, 
the Court inferred the anti-competitive ‘object’ from the formulae used for setting 
the fees.69 It rejected as an objective justification the prevention of free riding, as 
such fees would have restricted entry into the market.70 In contrast, the ECJ 
accepted that free riding was a legitimate concern.71 In his Opinion, AG Wahl72 
clarified that proof of a restriction of competition by object is needed whenever 
‘an analysis of the clauses of that agreement does not reveal the effect on 
competition to be sufficiently deleterious’. In other words, only ‘conduct whose 
harmful nature is proven and easily identifiable, in the light of experience and 
economics, should therefore be regarded as a restriction of competition by object’. 
This means that ‘agreements which, having regard to their context, have 
ambivalent effects on the market or which produce ancillary restrictive effects 
necessary for the pursuit of a main objective’73 do not restrict competition. This 
line of reasoning takes account of the dual-sided nature of the operating banking 
system. Traders would not agree to join this system if there were insufficient 
cardholders, as fewer consumers would join something that was not widely 
accepted by traders.74 In Gosselin,75 the ECJ agreed with the GC that the conduct 
of cover pricing and hidden commission payments qualifies as a restriction of 
competition by object. 
Finally, unrelated to cartels but relevant for the general assessment of “effects”, in 
MasterCard,76 the ECJ agreed with the EC that in the absence of a multilateral 
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interchange fee (MIF), the MasterCard system could remain economically viable 
and, therefore, the fee qualified as a restriction of competition by effect.77 In 
particular, the fee could reduce the pressure that merchants can exert on acquiring 
banks when negotiating merchants’ service charges and possibly lowering the 
service fees. The GC appeared to have previously disregarded the dual-sided 
nature of the market in question since the restrictive effects of the interchange fees 
should be objectively justified as an ancillary restriction.78 However, the ECJ 
considered that a justified improvement under Article 101(3) cannot be identified 
“with all the advantages which the parties obtain from the agreement in their 
production or distribution activities”.79 
Following, again, in the well-worn footsteps of Consten and Grunding, the ECJ went 
on to say that, even if there were advantages derived from one market to another, 
such advantages alone could not compensate for the disadvantages stemming from 
the anti-competitive effects of the measure in question.80 In other words, the 
beneficial effects of the MIF did not amount to “significant” objective advantages 
being required by Article 101(3).81 
 
II. From the public enforcement against EU cartels: an excursus into 
private enforcement 
As a general rule, under EU competition law, any individual is entitled to claim 
compensation for any loss incurred where there is a causal relationship between 
that loss and an infringement of the competition rules.82 The interplay between 
public and private enforcement in the area of cartels has, again, been in the 
spotlight in a reference for a preliminary ruling. The ECJ clarified that the 
interpretation of Article 101 precludes national legislation being able to 
categorically exclude any civil liability of undertakings belonging to a cartel for loss 
resulting from the fact that other tacitly colluding undertakings, even if not party 
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to the original cartel, also raised their own prices.83 Following this reasoning, 
participating undertakings could be held liable for collateral or incidental losses, i.e. 
unintended damage being incurred as a result of a third party’s higher pricing. 
However, this kind of liability could be supported solely on the basis of the 
tortious measure, which is more generous than the standard contractual liability,84 
the latter covering for indirect losses that are not too remote. It could be presumed 
that, outside of the original cartel, non-participating third party undertakings were 
reasonably aware of implementing it de facto, namely, by pursuing the same pricing 
policy as the original cartel that they were probably silently observing. This 
“added” liability,85 created by the ECJ, to shoulder cartel members differs greatly 
from, for example, having car insurance cover for injuries caused by a third party 
to one’s car, where your own fault or negligence as this car’s owner cannot be 
established. This is, first, because it was the cartel members’ fault in maintaining 
the illegal cartel, and, second, because they could not have possibly been insured 
against third parties implementing this illegal cartel. The legal difficulty is that one 
could put forward a similar tortious claim based on a “duty of care” owed by non-
cartelists, i.e. not to increase their pricing by taking advantage of the existence of a 
cartel to the point of actually implementing it. This could ultimately form the basis 
of an action in regress against so-called “umbrella pricing” by non-, but quasi, 
cartelists that acquired an unlawful profit, too, so they should never be offered the 
chance of an unjustified enrichment either. Being a third party to a cartel, but 
ultimately having contributed to its tacit implementation, cannot be accepted as a 
just cause of lawful enrichment. The orthodoxy of the proper measure of damages, 
which should have been clarified by the ECJ, is that the victim can chose only one 
measure and cannot therefore claim (i) compensation on the basis of contractual 
liability from the members of the cartel and (ii) extra-contractual liability based on 
tortious inaction by third party undertakings. The abridged route, as has been 
proposed by the ECJ, is to recover such “indirect” losses caused by a third party’s 
tortious inaction from the cartel members since the actual effects of this umbrella 
cartel were not clearly proven. This far-reaching interpretation, while certainly 
contrasting with a more ‘civilian’ categorical exclusion of liability is thus no novelty 
under EU competition law, which has long given stricter interpretations to, for 
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example, the concept of “joint” liability than to company law.86 This comes with 
the realisation that categorical exemption of liability for a third party’s action or 
inaction is designed (i) to protect an individual citizen (natural person) against a 
possible abuse of law, and (ii) to ease that same individual’s burden of proof when 
seeking fair and just compensation for undertakings’ illegal conduct, this time by 
not excluding the same type of liability applicable to them as legal persons. 
 
III. Procedural principles in cartel infringements in light of Article 6(2) 
ECHR 
One persistent bone of contention in appeals is the perceived strictness of the test 
applied as a legal presumption that the parent company is liable for the conduct of 
its subsidiary. In appeals, cartelists argued that being asked to effectively rebut this 
presumption of liability runs counter to the presumption of innocence laid down 
in Article 6(2) ECHR. The parent company is called upon to prove the negative, 
namely, that it gave no instructions to its subsidiary.87 Other cartelists went even 
further to argue that, in practice, this presumption amounts to a probation diabolica. 
In turn, the ECJ unambiguously stated that the fact that it is difficult to adduce 
evidence to the contrary does not, in itself, mean that the presumption is 
irrefutable.88 The ECJ had ruled that this presumption, i.e. that a company holding, 
directly or indirectly, all the capital of another company, exercises decisive 
influence over the latter, is “settled case-law”.89 Therefore, it does not infringe any 
presumption of innocence.90 In one of the Industrial bags cartels,91 the presumption 
had been applied to a parent company which exercised decisive influence over a 
subsidiary,92 in which it owned all the shares, through its most senior managers, 
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who had attended a number of cartel meetings. In Gas Insulated Switchgear, the ECJ 
reiterated that it is ‘settled case-law’ that the conduct of the subsidiary may be 
imputed to the parent company,  
“where, although having separate legal personality, that subsidiary does not decide 
independently upon its own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material 
respects, the instructions given to it by the parent company, having regard in 
particular to the economic, organisational and legal links between those two legal 
entities”.93 
In Degussa,94 the existence of a compliance programme and general instructions 
given to a subsidiary not to engage in cartel activities could not rebut the above 
presumption of liability. 
Another recurrent bone of contention is the protection of legitimate expectations 
and the principle of equal treatment.95 The latter prohibits treating similar 
situations differently and different situations the same way.96 For example, in 
Industrial bags,97 although both cartelists applied for a fine reduction, only one 
obtained it. Despite the argument that both were in the same situation, the ECJ 
ruled that the GC did not err in law by holding that the EC did not infringe the 
principle of equal treatment.98 As a matter of principle, a person may not rely on 
an unlawful act committed in favour of a third party.99 In other words, the 
principle of equal treatment has to be reconciled with the principle of legality.100 
Where an undertaking breaches Article 101 TFEU, it cannot escape being 
penalised on the grounds that other undertakings have not been fined.101 In Dow 
Chemicals, the “differential treatment” was based on the “economic capacity” to 
cause damage to competition.102 Since the actual effects could not be measured, 
the EC differentiated on the basis of sales figures, with the starting amount of the 
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fines a reflection of the above capacity to cause damage to competition.103 The 
ECJ made it clear that only an undertaking that had cooperated with the EC on 
the basis of the Leniency Notice could be granted a reduction of the fine.104 
Therefore, this benefit cannot be extended to another company, which, while it 
belonged to the company benefitting from the reduction during the infringement 
period, ceased to do so at the time when, under leniency, this company cooperated 
with the EC.105 However, a ‘voluntary and unsolicited’ disclosure by a cartelist of 
its cooperation with the EC during “on-site” inspections did not count as cartel 
discovery.106 
Another controversial interpretation was raised in Zip fasteners.107 The cartelists 
claimed that, by having applied the previous 1996 Leniency Notice instead of the 
latest 2000 Notice, the GC misread the lex mitior principle recognised by Articles 7 
ECHR and 49(1) EU Charter. According to this principle, the most lenient law 
applies retroactively. In particular, the cartelists argued that the evidence adduced 
provided significant added value to the EC’s investigation. In contrast, AG 
Wathelet highlighted that the cartelists had already claimed an additional reduction 
in the amount of the fine, so they had already benefitted from partial immunity. As 
the basis for the imposition of the fine was Article 23(2) and (3) of the Regulation 
1/2003, and since the application was introduced before the entry into force of the 
2002 Leniency, ratione temporis, it was right to apply the previous 1996 Leniency 
Notice. In Wathelet’s Opinion, the advantage, which had already been gained, 
constituted an inversion of the principle ne bis in indem,108 namely, a reduction in 
the fine for having provided ‘added value’ and immunity for the facts which the 
cartelists revealed.109 In other words, this would otherwise make it possible for an 
undertaking to be rewarded twice. Nonetheless, one could extract the proposition 
that even the general principle of non-retroactivity is being applied somewhat 
differently to such undertakings. This, again, was the case in Paraffin and Slack 
Waxes,110 where the GC agreed with the EC that applying the 2006 soft-law 
Guidelines, detailing the calculation of the fine provided for in Article 23(2) of the 
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Regulation 1/2003, made perfect economic sense since the Regulation allows the 
EC to adjust the level of the fine imposed on a thirteen-year-old cartel. 
The next issue of discord concerns the principle of proportionality with regard to 
the determination of cartel fines.111 The ECJ reiterated its previously held position 
when it ruled out joint or several liability (in order to guarantee that the parent 
company covers for its subsidiary) where the two companies form a single 
economic unit.112 By contrast, the amount of the fine has to be determined by 
reference to the gravity of the infringement, for which the company concerned is 
considered individually responsible, and the duration of the infringement.113 In Gas 
Insulated Switchgear, the ECJ held that, when ruling on points of law, the Court 
cannot substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the GC 
by exercising “its unlimited jurisdiction” to rule on the amount of fines imposed 
on undertakings. The only exception applies where the level of the fine is not 
“merely inappropriate”, but also “excessive” up to the point of being truly 
“disproportionate”.114 In Candle Waxes,115 the GC reminded that the exercise of 
unlimited jurisdiction does not amount to a review undertaken by the Court’s own 
motion and that the proceedings are inter partes. 
However, the EC’s power to impose penalties is limited to determining the 
amount of the fine, for the payment of which legal entities forming part of the 
same undertaking are held “jointly and severally liable”; it cannot decide on how 
the same fine is to be allocated internally.116 In other words, the GC erred in law 
when it ruled in the absence of any prior finding by the EC that some of the 
companies had a greater share of responsibility.117 In Heat Stabilisers, the GC 
maintained, again, its previous position that the method of calculation, as 
proposed in the soft law Guidelines on the calculation of fines,118 allows for 
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certain disparities to occur in the setting of the fines. Although this calculation is 
not based on the overall turnover of an undertaking, it is irrelevant for the purpose 
of establishing a possible breach of the principles of proportionality and of equal 
treatment.119 The Guidelines mention that, in order to take into account the 
duration of the participation of each undertaking in the cartel, the amount, which 
is determined on the basis of the value of sales, will be “multiplied by the number 
of years of participation”.120 
Several times, a wrong multiplier has been applied by the EC, leading to a fine 
reduction on appeal.121 Previously, in Dow Chemical, an allegation that the applied 
multiplier for deterrence was excessive and discriminatory had failed,122 since in 
the exercise of its power of ‘unlimited jurisdiction’, the GC cannot make just a 
‘mechanical recourse’ to an arithmetical formula based only on the turnover of the 
undertaking concerned. On appeal, one undertaking asked the EC for a fine 
reduction due to inability to pay, which failed. Despite the undertaking’s 
precarious financial situation,123 this factor could not jeopardise its economic 
viability, even in the event of its bankruptcy. 
 
IV. A quasi-criminal nature of cartel fines in light of Article 6(1) ECHR? 
Another heated argument is whether the above penalties imposed in cartel 
proceedings, on the basis of Regulation 1/2003, could be considered as “criminal”, 
or at least “quasi-criminal” in scope, since they do not apply to “natural” 
persons.124 Obviously, it is the latter case, since undertakings enjoy a legal 
personality. Penalties have to meet the “Engel criteria”,125 as developed by the 
ECtHR,126 to qualify for the “hard core” area of criminal law, in particular, where a 
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penalty requires the deprivation of liberty. However, imprisonment is not decisive 
in excluding the inherently criminal character of an offence.127 Despite the 
domestic classification of the fine as administrative, having regard to its high 
level128 and deterrent purpose,129 the fine imposed on Menarini130 was considered 
to be criminal under Article 6(1) ECHR, since the Engel criteria are not required 
cumulatively.131 In Schindler,132 the cartelists contested the GC’s finding that the 
EC’s decisions do not belong to the “hard core” area of criminal law, arguing that 
the Court wrongly transposed Jussila133 to cartel proceedings by accepting that 
outside of the above area, the decision does not need to be adopted by a tribunal. 
They also contested the transposition of Menarini as the EC is not an 
“independent” administrative authority. The ECJ dismissed the above claims by 
saying that the EC’s administrative decisions in imposing fines in competition 
matters are still compatible with Article 6 ECHR. For the ECJ, “entrusting” both 
the prosecution and the punishment of breaches of competition law to an 
administrative authority (in the first instance) does not make the current system 
incompatible as long as the decision can still be challenged before a tribunal.134 
In light of Menarini, AG Kokott asserted that this recognition does not trigger a 
breach of Article 6 ECHR,135 since Menarini had access to a domestic court, 
exercising full jurisdiction (i.e. the power to quash the decision on questions of fact 
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and law),136 which carried out a complete judicial review137 of the administrative 
decision of the Italian competition authority, rather than a mere “formal” review 
of legality. The separate Opinion of Judge Albuquerque warned of the emergence 
of a so-called “pseudo” criminal law with two speeds, where an overly powerful 
public administration imposes extremely severe financial penalties, but does so in 
the absence of the classical guarantees of criminal procedural law, which could 
ultimately “usurp” the judiciary.138 
In light of the above, in Paraffin and Slack Waxes,139 the GC made the following 
statement: 
“While competition law is indeed similar to criminal law, it is not at the ‘heart’ of 
criminal law”.  
This is tantamount to saying, “Here we have an apple” that is not really an apple. 
In reality, the Court was interested only in emphasising that the above criminal 
procedural safeguards, which Judge Albuquerque referred to as lacking, are 
inapplicable outside the “hard core of criminal law”.140 The Court went on to state 
that 
“unlike criminal law, both the benefits and the penalties for unlawful activities are 
purely pecuniary”.141 
In the eyes of the Court, if the fines were “more or less predictable, this would 
have highly damaging consequences for the European Union competition 
policy”,142 in particular, if the offenders could calculate in advance the cartel’s 
benefits against an eventual fine.143 
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C. A critical review of the substantive rights of defence 
Some of the undertakings’ rights of defence are mirrored by the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, others by Article 6 ECHR.144 The right to good 
administration of justice finds recognition in Article 41 of the EU Charter. 
Accordingly, every person has the right to be handled “impartially, fairly and 
within a reasonable time”. Under Article 44(1)(c) of the GC’s Rules of Procedure, 
the summary of an application must be “sufficiently clear and precise” to enable 
the defendant to prepare its defence.145 Therefore, a mere abstract statement of 
the grounds for appeal does not meet these requirements. On appeal, very many 
pleas were practically left unsubstantiated, alleging, inter alia, an infringement of the 
right to good administration in a superficial manner, which contributed to their 
rejection. 
 
I. The right to a fair presentation of evidence: the statement of objection 
In Road Pavement Bitumen,146 the ECJ followed the GC’s previous approach, which 
required the statement of objections (SO) to be sufficiently clear as to afford the 
undertakings concerned the opportunity to make known their views on the 
relevance of the alleged facts.147 Although each group of undertakings constituted 
a single undertaking, the SO mentioned that the parent company was in a position 
to exercise decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiaries. This statement 
had been made without any clarification of the nature of the relationship between 
the two, in particular, the participation of the subsidiaries’ managing director. This 
is why the GC emphasised later that the SO’s wording should have been clearer.148 
However, the ECJ found that the GC erred in law149 when it considered that the 
failure to provide in the SO any additional evidence for the existence of a single 
economic unit made sufficiently clear the EC’s intention to apply the presumption 
of decisive influence.150 The SO was even more ambiguous since the subsidiary, 
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participating through its managing director, received no such SO.151 Furthermore, 
it was unclear from the parent company’s reply to the SO whether this company 
actually understood its potential liability for its wholly-owned subsidiary. On this 
basis, the ECJ found that the parent company’s rights of defence had, indeed, been 
infringed.152 
 
II. The right to equality of arms 
The principle of “audi alteram partem”, i.e. “hear the other side, too”, allows the 
accused party to present the case without being placed at a substantial 
disadvantage vis-à-vis its opponent. In Guardian Industries,153 the principle of 
equality of arms was referred to as a “corollary of the very concept of a fair 
hearing”, whose aim is to ensure a balance between the parties so that they have 
the opportunity to examine and challenge any document submitted to the court 
and so be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present the case. The issue in 
dispute was the receipt by Guardian of the copy of a letter only three days before 
the hearing. The ECJ dismissed it since Guardian Industries had neither asked the 
GC to comment on that letter in writing, nor had Guardian requested that the 
hearing be postponed. Reference to the principle of equality of arms was 
previously made in Bathroom Fittings and Fixtures,154 where it was alleged that the EC 
used documents to which the cartelists themselves did not have access. Since the 
documents in question were not to be found in the EC’s investigation file either, 
the rights of defence would have been jeopardised only if the cartelists had 
expressly asked to have access to them.155 In this case, while they had indeed asked 
for access to the documents, the appeal was dismissed because they had failed to 
also seek an extension for responding to them. 
 
III. The right to have access to file 
As a matter of principle, no judge can rely on evidence presented by a party that 
has not been shown to the other party and on which the latter has been unable to 
present an observation. The ECJ held that, as a rule, before being heard, the 
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parties have a right to inspect and comment on the existing evidence and to 
submit observations to the court.156 It then falls on the courts to balance the 
protection of confidentiality whenever access to the file is required against the 
need to allow the parties to participate usefully in the proceedings.157 
In principle, access to the file attempts to reconcile an institutional interest in the 
smooth running of inspections, investigations, audit, or court proceedings with the 
undertakings’ interest in protecting against disclosure their own commercial 
interests or other sensitive business information. In Heat stabilisers,158 one of the 
grounds for annulment of the EC’s decision was that the EC had denied cartelists 
access to all of the requested documents on its file, including partial access to non-
confidential versions of such documents. The GC reiterated that it is “settled case 
law” that Article 4 of the Transparency Regulation 1049/2001 constitutes an 
exception to the general principle of public access to such documents.159 
Therefore, it must be interpreted and applied restrictively. However, whenever 
such a request is received, the institution in question is required to carry out ‘a 
concrete, individual assessment’ of the content of such documents.160 
Unfortunately, the EC failed to do so, though it could have provided access to a 
non-confidential version of the undertakings’ requests and to the first 
questionnaire. The EC wrongly refused such access in order to protect the 
undertakings’ commercial interests.161 Furthermore, in order for the above refusal 
to be justified, the EC should have provided ‘explanations as to how access to that 
document could specifically and actually undermine the interest protected by an 
exception to disclosure’.162  
To date, the Court has made use of general presumptions in four cases concerning 
documents on administrative files relating to a procedure for reviewing State aid; 
documents exchanged between the EC and notifying or third parties in merger 
control proceedings; the plea lodged by one of the EU institutions in court 
proceedings; and documents concerning an infringement procedure during the 
pre-litigation stage.163 The ECJ held that it is sufficient for an undertaking being 
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refused access to either incriminatory or exculpatory documents to prove that it 
would have been able to use any such exculpatory documents for its defence.164 
Under the ECHR, the Court will not review whether a refusal of disclosure was 
justified, but whether the decision-making procedure complied with the other 
procedural guarantees, such as an adversarial hearing or equality of arms.165 
An overriding public interest in disclosure must be “objective and general in 
nature” and must be “distinguishable” from individual or private interests.166 The 
Court clarified that the beneficiaries of the right of access under the Transparency 
Regulation 1049/2001 are  
“any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member 
State”.167 
Disclosure should undermine (i) the protection of commercial interests of a 
specific natural or legal person or the purpose of investigations, inspections, and 
audits,168 or (ii) the institution’s decision-making process, in particular, where the 
document contains opinions for internal use only as part of deliberations and 
primary consultations within the institution concerned. 
The above exceptions have to take into account the specific rules governing access 
under Regulations 1/2003 and 773/2004,169 which pursue different objectives. 
None of them expressly gives one regulation primacy over the other, which creates 
a conflict of norms.170 The Court simply stated that if third parties, who have no 
right to access the file under the specialist regulations, were to obtain access on the 
basis of the more favourable Transparency Regulation, then the former could 
clearly be undermined.171 It follows that it is preferable to apply the continental 
principle, i.e. the special precedes the general norm (specialia generalibus derogant), 
than the principle of lex melior, i.e. the more favourable regulation granting third 
parties access to the file. The ECJ found that the GC had previously erred in law 
by finding that an eventual disclosure of the documents requested was unlikely to 
undermine the protection of the EC’s investigations.172 In Airfreight,173 the GC 
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explained that the above interpretation that restricts third parties’ access to the file 
is really needed; otherwise, disclosure could discourage potential whistleblowers 
from making corporate statements. 
The GC clarified in Aluminium Fluoride174 that where access has been refused, the 
undertaking has to show that the document in question would have been useful in 
its defence. In other words, it is not necessary for it to have influenced the course 
of the proceedings, the content of the EC’s decision or, indeed, the outcome of 
the administrative procedure. In this case, the Court held that the EC was wrong 
to refuse access to a non-confidential version of a part of the decision whose 
confidentiality had previously not been raised as being an issue. 
The most significant ruling on access is Mastercard,175 where the GC found that the 
EC wrongly denied access to an internal study of the costs and benefits to 
merchants accepting different methods of payment. When an institution is asked 
to disclose a document on the basis of the exceptions foreseen by 
Regulation 1049/2001, that institution must also assess whether the document falls 
within any of its exceptions, in particular, access that might undermine the 
institution’s decision-making process, such as  
“attempts to influence and exert external pressure or curtail its independence”.176 
This is something the EC failed to prove.177 It was not enough that an internal 
study, reflecting preliminary results, concerned a protected interest. Rather, the 
institution was required to assess whether disclosure could specifically and actually 
undermine the protected interest.178 For example, one cannot regard all 
information concerning a company and its business relations as commercially 
sensitive,179 except for sale figures, market shares, or customer relations.180 In 
addition, the risk of that interest being undermined should be reasonably 
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foreseeable, and not purely hypothetical.181 In fact, the preliminary nature of the 
study and the fact that it was still being commented upon by the EC did not 
establish that its decision-making process could be seriously undermined.182  
Therefore, the reality of external pressures should have been established with 
certainty, by adducing evidence to show that there was indeed such a risk of being 
undermined.183 The EC did not adduce any such evidence.184 
 
IV. The right to be heard before an independent and impartial tribunal 
The argument that the EC is not a ‘tribunal’ within the meaning of Articles 6 
ECHR or 47 EU Charter has recently been raised in the Removals cartel.185 It 
consists of two major requirements. On the one hand, subjective impartiality 
requires that no competition official shows “bias or personal prejudice in any 
way”, and on the other, objective impartiality is required. The latter requirement 
demands that sufficient guarantees exist to exclude any legitimate doubt as to bias 
on the part of the competition agency.186 In view of the cartelists, the fact that the 
EC, acting as any State authority, brings proceedings against them and later also 
fines them for the existence of the cartel, misses the “objective impartiality” 
target.187 What matters is that all the necessary precautions are taken in order to 
avoid  
“any semblance of bias in the eyes of the persons concerned”.188 
AG Kokott suggested that, as an administrative authority, the EC does not need to 
satisfy the “same strict requirements” as an independent tribunal within the 
meaning of Article 47 EU Charter as long as the EC’s administrative decisions are 
subject to independent judicial review by the EU Courts.189 However, a pertinent 
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argument raised by AG Kokott in Schindler190 is that the right to an impartial tribunal 
under Article 47 could not be relied upon to demand a “fundamental modification 
of the distribution of competences” between the EC, acting as an administrative 
competition authority, and the EU Courts. This is a lucid observation since the 
ECHR does not create rights where such rights are not afforded protection by 
domestic, i.e. EU law. Therefore, the only way to sort out any perceived lack of 
independence and impartiality is by undergoing an institutional reform, no matter 
how difficult to achieve this could be. 
Another rather amusing argument raised before the GC, but ultimately rejected, 
was that the above requirement of being heard before an independent tribunal was 
not met where the cartelists had not been heard by ‘judges’, as none of the 
members of the College of Commissioners had attended the undertakings’ 
hearing.191 
 
V. The right to a reasoned decision 
In recent times, the right to a reasoned decision is one of the most common 
grounds heard on appeal. The failure to state reasons concerns a matter of public 
policy which the Courts are required to raise on their own motion.192 Therefore, 
the EC must give reasons for its ultimate decision based on the results of its entire 
investigation.193 For example, in Liquid Crystals, the GC relied on an appeal in the 
area of merger proceedings (Bertelsmann and Sony v Impala) in order to clarify that 
the EC is not obliged to explain any differences between its final and provisional 
assessments.194 
In Nexans,195 the cartelists submitted that the GC had failed to state reasons. 
According to Article 36 of the Statute of the ECJ and Article 81 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the GC, the GC did not “explain adequately” how it had reached the 
conclusion that the alleged infringement ‘probably’ had a “global reach”.196 The 
inspection decision also lacked precision on the same geographic scope. The 
cartelists went on to argue that, since the conduct affected markets outside the 
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EU, it was unclear how this could have affected the internal market. Rather, the 
lack of precision of the said decision affected their rights of defence, thereby 
preventing them from “understanding the exact scope of their obligation to 
cooperate”.197 The ECJ recognised the brevity of the decision.198 It stated that, 
while the EC cannot carry out an inspection if the suspected cartel does not affect 
the internal market, it may still examine documents relating to outside markets in 
order to detect whether such conduct could potentially affect the internal 
market.199 The Court found that the GC had properly explained why it held that 
the EC had described in sufficient detail the scope of the suspected cartel.200 The 
same approach had previously been proposed by AG Kokott, namely, that it is 
unnecessary that the relevant market is precisely defined in the inspection 
decision.201 
The ECJ had previously explained, notably in Solvay,202 what can reasonably be 
expected of a statement of reasons, specifically, to be appropriate to the measure 
at issue and to disclose the reasoning in a clear and unequivocal fashion.203 The 
latter requirement has to enable the court to exercise its power of review.204 The 
Court recognised with almost precedential value, i.e. “as settled case-law”, that the 
above requirements need to be analysed by reference to the circumstances of the 
case, in particular, the content of the measure and its addresses. It is unnecessary 
to refer to all the relevant facts and points of law.  
As has been unambiguously stated in Solvay, it is not only the wording of the 
statement of reasons, but also “the context and all the rules governing the matter” 
which need to be carefully examined before reaching the conclusion of an 
inadequate statement of reasons.205 For example, in Bananas,206 the GC dismissed 
the appeal on the grounds of the EC’s failure to identify clearly and unequivocally 
the various types of information exchanged that it regarded as unlawful, in 
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particular, the price-setting factors. In yet another recent appeal,207 the Court 
considered that the statement of reasons was adequate, in particular, since the EC 
had stressed the importance of imposing a fine with a deterrent effect and 
emphasised the special nature of electronic records. For the latter, there is, indeed, 
a greater risk of manipulation and concealment than for paper records. The 
undertaking did so in order to avoid a higher fine. Although in one instance, the 
undertaking had acted only negligently, while the incoming e-mails were being 
diverted to its own server, this infringement continued for a significant period of 
time during the EC’s inspection. 
In Gascone, the ECJ ruled that the GC was not obliged to provide in the statement 
of reason an ‘account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments’ 
put forward by the parties.208 However, in Removals,209 AG Kokott clarified that it is 
both in the spirit and purpose of the obligation to state reasons; thus, the 
explanations to be given by the EC  
“must be more detailed the greater the extent to which the penalty imposed 
exceeds the minimum requirements laid down in the guidelines on fines”. 
This statement creates legitimate expectations that the higher the fine being 
contemplated, the lengthier the ruling will be, though this does not necessarily 
make it clearer. 
According to Article 20(4) Regulation 1/2003, an inspection decision must 
indicate both the subject matter and the purpose of the inspection. Both 
requirements are essential to ensure that the undertakings concerned understand 
the scope of their duty to cooperate and that their rights of defence are being duly 
observed.210 Thus, there is no obligation to communicate to the addresses all the 
information that the EC has at its disposal or to make a “precise” legal analysis of 
the alleged infringements, e.g. to define exactly the relevant market.211 
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In Industrial bags,212 the cartelists submitted that the EC explained only at the 
hearing before the GC that it had relied on the presumption of decisive influence 
of the parent company over its subsidiary where it held a 100 % shareholding. 
During the written procedure, they complained that the decision was vitiated by a 
defective statement of reasons since the EC insisted that the presumption of 
liability had not been rebutted.213 The obligation to state reasons was regarded as a 
“corollary” of the principle of respect for the rights of defence.214 First, this 
obligation must provide sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain 
whether the administrative act is vitiated by a defect, and to enable it to be 
reviewed by the judicature.215 
In Bananas,216 the Court considered that the EC fulfilled its obligation to state 
reasons where it had indicated the factors that enabled it to measure the gravity 
and the duration of the infringement. A more detailed account or figures relating 
to the method used to calculate the fine was, therefore, unnecessary.217 
As a general rule, a statement of reasons, which is sent to a parent company held 
responsible for the unlawful conduct of its subsidiary, must be capable of 
justifying the attribution to the parent company of liability for that infringement.218 
However, the ECJ held that the GC was right not to take issue with the EC for 
failing to give specific reasons concerning the imposition of a fine to be paid 
jointly and severally by those companies, which no longer formed a single 
undertaking.219 This approach is seemingly inconsistent with previous rulings. 
 
VI. The right to decide within a reasonable time 
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A recurrent basis for appeal put forward by cartelists is, on the basis of Article 47 
EU Charter and Article 6(1) ECHR, the right to receive a ruling within a 
“reasonable” time in respect of the enshrined principle of effective judicial 
protection.220 For example, in Heat Stabilisers,221 the GC recalled that almost a 
precedential value was being attached to compliance with the procedural 
requirement of reasonable time. Both institutions could be reproached for the 
misfortunate time lag, namely, the EC’s administrative procedure, on the one 
hand, and the judicial review of the ECJ, on the other. For example, in Industrial 
bags, six years passed between the initiation of proceedings and the delivery of the 
judgement under appeal.222 The GC remained inactive for most of this period, 
namely, for the four years and four months between the end of the written 
procedure and the date of the hearing. The ECJ recalled the ECtHR’s ruling in 
Kudla v Poland,223 where such a procedural irregularity gave the party concerned the 
right to an effective remedy. In Aluminium Fluoride,224 a procedural delay of four 
years and nine months until the hearing, with a period of three years of inactivity, 
was dismissed on appeal. 
Nevertheless, the ECJ cannot allow the cartelists to re-open the question on the 
amount of the fine solely on the basis of a failure to adjudicate within a reasonable 
time.225 The Court considered that such a failure could only be remedied in a 
subsequent action for damages brought before the GC.226 For example, in Gascogne 
Sack,227 the Court held that a failure to decide within a reasonable time could be 
remedied solely by granting appropriate relief of this kind. It then falls to the same 
Court, ‘sitting in a different composition’ from that which heard the appeal,228 to 
assess the relationship between the harm caused and the excessive length of the 
legal proceedings.229 Again, it falls to the GC to ascertain whether, apart from any 
material loss, any other type of harm could be compensated for due to excessive 
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delay.230 In particular, Gascogne evidenced having paid interest on the amount of 
the fine and having provided a bank guarantee. 
The ECJ was bold to acknowledge that the GC’s failure to adjudicate within a 
reasonable time was a sufficiently serious breach of the rule of law, which was 
intended to confer rights on individuals.231 Yet, in Industrial bags,232 the cartelist 
submitted that, by not adjudicating within a reasonable time, the GC infringed 
both Articles 47 EU Charter and 6(1) ECHR. In particular, the duration of the 
judicial review by the GC exceeded six years, with extensive periods of inactivity 
on its part. It took four years and four months between the closing of the written 
procedure and the oral hearing. The ECJ reiterated the same reasoning, including 
Kudla v Poland and the right to an effective remedy, which dates back to Kendrion,233 
where the ECJ acknowledged that the length of the proceedings before the GC of 
five years and nine months could not be justified by the particular circumstances 
of the case.  
What can one take from all of the above arguments? There is no better evidence 
elsewhere of a real need to set up an EU Competition Tribunal. As advanced 
elsewhere, in 2013, the average duration of a competition case was forty-six 
months,234 which was more than twice the average duration in other areas. Even 
the suggestion that the above failures to adjudicate be reviewed by the same court, 
albeit in a different composition, is very unlikely to eliminate the GC’s own 
caseload and to address the need for a specialised court that performs a full judicial 
review. 
When delivering her opinion on the raw tobacco cartel (Deltafina),235 AG 
Sharpston critically considered as ‘excessively lengthy’ the proceedings’ duration of 
five years and eight months compared to Baustahlgewebe.236 In this latter case, the 
Court held that five years and six months was “an excessive delay”.237 
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Furthermore, forty-three months elapsed between the end of the written 
procedure and the decision to open the oral phase. Thus, such a procedural failure 
would have no negative effect on the outcome itself; annulling the judgement 
could not have effectively remedied the breach of the principle of effective judicial 
protection.238 In other words, the Court should not re-open the question of the 
validity or amount of the fine.239 However, in Deltafina,240 the ECJ held that the 
length of these proceedings “cannot be justified either by the certain degree of 
difficulty of the case” or by Deltafina’s application seeking access to a document 
held by the EC. In Guardian Industries, the ECJ only acknowledged that a period of 
four years and seven months could not be justified by any particular 
circumstances.241 
Similarly, in Heat Stabilisers,242 the ECJ found no legal basis for the annulment of 
the EC’s decision on grounds of excessively long proceedings where the ability of 
the undertakings concerned to defend themselves had not been adversely affected 
and where there was no indication that such an excessive duration could have 
affected the content of the EC’s decision.243 In this particular case, the applicant 
argued that, as a result of the excessive duration of the administrative proceedings, 
the fine imposed in 2009 was higher than it would have been in 2004 when its 
turnover was much lower.244 Obviously, the ECJ rejected this point as “extremely 
generic and entirely unsupported by detailed evidence”.245 If this were the case, 
namely, that the EC had intentionally waited for the cartelists’ turnover to increase, 
before imposing the fine, then the EU public administration deserves some praise 
for bringing in more money to the EU budget, albeit based on purely unjustified 
enrichment. At the end of the day, no problem would emerge for taxpayers unless 
the fine on this cartel was too low.  
Even more dubious was the enormous time lag between the sending of a first 
statement of objections, namely, four years and ten months after the end of the 
infringement and three years and six months after the beginning of the 
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investigation.246 The prohibition decision had been adopted one year and five 
months after the first SO, which was not considered to be within the framework 
of a reasonable time. However, excessive proceedings of this kind could not lead 
to an annulment of the administrative decision insofar as the decision did not 
“adversely” affect the rights of defence of the cartelist. 
On a comparative basis, in the UK, the former OFT (now Competition and 
Markets Authority) had also been heavily criticised;247 first, for under-enforcing 
competition laws and, second, for taking an excessively long time to complete its 
administrative investigations, i.e. on average, thirty-three months for cartels.248 In 
particular, the OFT took a record length of thirty-eight months to conclude a 
leniency-based investigation, and twenty-nine months in the absence of leniency. 
However, overall, the current situation is, perhaps, not too bad if one considers 
that, under the ECHR, the reasonable time has frequently been in excess of what 
could amount to a “reasonable” time,249 with excessive delays ranging from 
thirteen years and four months250 to five years and five months.251 
 
VII. The EU judicial review of cartel infringements: a call for an EU 
competition tribunal? 
Despite the lack of an EU Competition Tribunal, the ECJ has to exercise its 
powers of judicial review, including complex economic assessments, not only of 
the legality of the EC’s administrative decision or of the judgement of the GC. As 
recently pronounced in Chalkor252 and Toshiba,253 while the EC enjoys a margin of 
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discretion with regard to economic matters, this cannot be interpreted in the sense 
that the EU Courts must refrain from reviewing such administrative decisions.254 
Obviously, this margin of appreciation did not vitiate the EC’s administrative 
decision. Thus, although the EC carries out both investigating and prosecutorial 
administrative functions, this does not represent a breach of the requirement of 
impartiality.255 Nonetheless, the cartelists put forward various other interesting 
arguments aimed at proving the lack of subjective impartiality since the 
Commissioner for Competition expressed publically his views on the outcome of 
the administrative proceedings by saying that ‘the undertakings could therefore be 
certain that they would not escape, on procedural grounds, the fines imposed in 
the cartel cases’.256 If this message were to have come from a judge, before 
deciding on the case, that judge would have been removed from the case for 
subjective bias and lack of impartiality.257 This has happened where public 
expressions have implied that the judge had already formed an unfavourable view 
of the applicant’s case.258 However, as it comes from a politician, at the same time 
a member of the EC’s College of Commissioners, representing the executive of 
the EU ‘Government’, and not the judiciary, it did not. The GC considered that 
such public statements were not a pure ‘manifestation of bias’,259 but  
“merely the assertion of a clear intention, wholly consistent with the task entrusted 
to the EC […] in order not to undermine the effectiveness of EU competition 
law”. 
 
VIII. The right not to incriminate oneself (self-incrimination) 
The EC can compel undertakings to provide all the necessary information 
regarding the existence of a cartel and to disclose to the EC any “incriminating” 
documents. An equivalent “human” right not to give evidence against oneself, as 
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applied in Orkem v EC,260 would otherwise make it impossible for the EC to oblige 
these undertaking to offer answers, some of which might even admit the existence 
of an illegal cartel.261 This ECHR’s principle has also been weighted by AG Mazák, 
in his Opinion in Pfleiderer, where the Advocate-General advanced that with the 
exception of self-incriminating corporate statements cartel victims should have 
access to documents submitted under leniency, insofar this could help them to 
seek compensation.262  
 
D. Conclusions 
A first preliminary finding is that the goal of market integration has reached an 
evolutionary stage by protecting, foremost, intermediary market participants 
affected by pernicious cartels. Therefore, the corollary finding is that at a supra-
national level, the vast majority of prohibited cartels cause harm to intermediate 
industrial consumers, and despite fantastic efforts invested in the detection of EU 
cartels, more needs to be done to combat the little but ugly cartels that directly 
harm the welfare of the final consumer. At present, the Directorate-General for 
Competition operates on the assumption that giant cartels also cause harm to the 
final consumer, albeit indirectly. 
A second preliminary finding is that, from a substantive point of review, the 
prohibition enshrined in Article 101 has been inconsistently applied in practice, as 
the Courts have insisted that intention is not of crucial relevance and have often 
affixed the label of a ‘restriction of competition by object’ where, in fact, it was a 
restriction by effect. From a procedural point of view, another preliminary finding 
is that superficial and not properly substantiated arguments touching upon the 
respect of the procedural rights afforded by the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights have been rather unhelpful in securing success on appeals. 
A third preliminary finding is that, while being a settled case-law with utmost 
precedential value, the presumption of parent company liability for the actions of 
its subsidiary remains one issue of discord from the perspective of company law 
and the undertakings concerned. More needs to be done to enhance the 
procedural guarantees available to such undertakings and to alleviate further 
concerns regarding the severity of fines, in particular, merely unfounded claims 
alleging the ‘criminal nature’ of the fines. 
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A fourth preliminary finding, which one could easily extract from the critical 
review of the undertakings’ rights of defence, is that it would seem a lot easier to 
acquire access to file on the basis of the Transparency Regulation 1049/2001. 
However, doing so could risk undermining the specific objectives of Regulations 
1/2003 and 773/2004. The EU Courts have been particularly mindful of the latter. 
Possibly, the recognition of the excessive length of competition proceedings could 
serve as a helpful step in articulating the particular need for an EU Competition 
Tribunal. Otherwise, a referral back to the same overloaded instance that was 
instrumental in causing this procedural breach would not resolve the problem, and 
could not offer the Courts the necessary time to reflect on the subtle details, both 
civil and economic, of a given case. The latter are quite important as they could 
ease the individuals’ burden of proof in seeking damages against illegal cartels and 
securing just and fair compensation. By treating in passing any such aspects due to 
the pressures of time and procedural economy, the Courts could obfuscate access 
to justice in the long run and, as a result, this could lead to under-enforcement of 
private litigation. At the same time, by not performing a timely review, the Courts 
risk raising the expectations in terms of burden of proof and substantive analysis 
to burden the EC even more, while the Court would appear to indulge in more 
self-sufficiency.  
Apart from the perceived technical formalism advanced by the Courts, the 
downside of their performance and conservative stance gives the impression of a 
cosmetic review. Although the Courts seem to be better at calculating the “right” 
multiplier of the fine, in reality, these reductions of fines come at the expense of 
the EU taxpayer, thereby reducing the EC’s discretion over its deterrence policy 
against illegal cartels. 
As far as this author has been able to detect, arguments construed against the 
perceived lack of impartiality of the College of Commissioners, in particular that of 
the Commissioner responsible for Competition Policy, could be further 
considered with the view of establishing an independent European Competition 
Authority. This should help to alleviate previous stakeholders’ and undertakings’ 
concerns. 
On the whole, there seems to be no massive shift of perspective on the part of the 
Courts. As expounded earlier, the revolutionary “more-effects” based approach, 
which was expected to better expose the actual harm caused to consumers, was 
probably too ambitious in scope. Finally, the area under review being that of 
European Union industrial cartels, where both the public and the academic 
opinion converge on their outright negative effects, one could argue that proof of 
anti-competitive effects has for long been settled by their very anti-competitive 
object. 
 
